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Abstract. Drug policy scholars generally agree that coercive attempts by the United States
to reduce drug supplies from abroad have negative side effects. This article confirms that
US coercion has made a bad situation worse. However, it also argues against oversimplified
statements about the creation of side effects. The empirical focus is on the Air Bridge Denial
Program, a US-sponsored attempt from the late 1980s to 2001 to reduce aerial drug trafficking
in South America. A causal mechanism is developed that helps to understand and explain how
air interdiction contributed to the displacement of coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia,
an increase in Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine production, and a diversification of trafficking
routes and methods. The analysis also examines contingent conditions, empirical black boxes,
and alternative explanations. A complex empirical picture means that the popular metaphor
of a balloon whose air, when squeezed, simply moves elsewhere is misleading. Although US-
sponsored air interdiction has contributed to displacement, other factors have played a role as
well.
Introduction1
Sometimes metaphors are nice and misleading. It has become a truism in
drug policy research that the illicit cocaine and heroin industry resembles
a balloon filled with air or water. If this “balloon” is squeezed by law en-
forcement, the air or water, i.e. the coca or opium poppy fields, cocaine and
heroin production sites, and trafficking routes, simply shift elsewhere. Critics
of US foreign drug policy use the balloon metaphor to illustrate their argu-
ment that coercive strategies against drugs merely lead to the displacement
of the drug industry from one country or world region to another. This article
argues that the balloon metaphor oversimplifies the highly complex process
of displacement. However, complexity does not mean that displacement is
immune to scholarly analysis. The article’s main aim is to provide a heuristic
explanation of displacement. Empirically, it focuses on the Air Bridge Denial
Program (ABDP), a US-sponsored air interdiction program implemented in
South America from the late 1980s until 2001, which is often said to have
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shifted the cocaine industry from Peru to Colombia and diversified drug smug-
gling routes and methods in South America.
The first part of the article briefly describes the drug policy literature. It
shows that scholars have examined side effects of US drug policy in general,
and the displacement of the drug industry in particular, but that shortcomings
remain. Following this, a causal mechanism for understanding and explaining
displacement is developed. In the subsequent empirical analysis, the article
provides a chronological account of the ABDP as a first step for understanding
and explaining the dynamics on the South American cocaine market in the
1990s. In a second step, the article examines the causal mechanism and its
constituting elements. It is shown that the ABDP contributed to the displace-
ment of coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia, an increase in Peruvian and
Bolivian cocaine production, and a proliferation of trafficking routes. This
is because law enforcement pressure was applied selectively, traffickers dis-
played an impressive ability to avoid interdiction, and South American secu-
rity forces were relatively weak. Numerous contingent conditions contributed
to displacement as well. These contingent conditions pose formidable prob-
lems for the development of a theory of displacement and should lead to the
abandonment of the oversimplified balloon metaphor. Additional analytical
problems arise because of empirical black boxes and alternative explanations
for displacement. A last section sums up the findings, the most important of
which is that although the ABDP was not the only reason for displacement,
it was an important one.
Achievements of drug policy research
The literature on drugs and drug policies has grown enormously over the recent
years. Despite many disagreements, there are also many points where analyses
converge. Scholars agree, for example, that the US has dominated international
drug control. The US federal government has trained and equipped security
forces around the world, has undertaken diplomatic, economic, and military
initiatives against drugs, and has shaped the international drug control regime
in the framework of the United Nations.2 In their attempts to reduce US
drug problems, US policymakers rely mainly on coercion against farmers
growing illicit crops, traffickers, and the governments of drug-producing and
transit countries. Non-coercive strategies such as alternative development have
received a relatively small share of the estimated nearly $45 billion spent by
the US on international drug control activities between 1980 and 2004.3
Scholars also agree that drug problems have become worse over the last
decades. Coca and poppy cultivation, cocaine and heroin production, and the
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number of drug-producing and transit countries have soared. More people have
begun to consume illicit drugs or have switched to harder drugs and to more
dangerous consumption methods. The illicit drug industry has had disastrous
consequences for individuals and states. The increase in drug demand and
supply has been accompanied by violent conflict, corruption, environmental
degradation, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.4
Most drug policy analysts argue that the simultaneous increase in drug
problems and in US coercion is no coincidence. Rather, US drug policies are
regarded as having made matters worse by creating negative side effects. Drug
prohibition creates a thriving illicit market by increasing risks, and thus prof-
its, for drug entrepreneurs.5 On the ‘micro’ level, scholars argue that attempts
to implement prohibition through coercive means have side effects. US pres-
sure on one drug producing or transit country can affect geographical shifts
of coca and poppy cultivation, cocaine and heroin production, and drug traf-
ficking routes (this ‘balloon effect’ is discussed further below). US military
aid can exacerbate human rights abuses by strengthening security forces and
paramilitaries, and thus undermine the democratic control of armed forces.6
US diplomatic pressure on other countries can fuel anti-US nationalist senti-
ments, for example in Mexico, where the annual certification process is seen
as violating the national dignity.7 Washington’s demands that foreign gov-
ernments reduce drug supplies can expose security forces and government
officials to the debilitating influence of corruption and thus undermine state
accountability and democratic stability in foreign countries.8 US diplomatic
pressure and financial incentives can lead to turf battles when US and foreign
drug control agencies are created or reshuffled. 9 US demands on foreign gov-
ernments to implement prohibition can make consumers switch from cannabis
or opium to heroin, and from smoking to injection, and thus lead to the spread
of HIV/AIDS.10 Last, but not least, the aerial fumigation of coca and poppy
fields threatens animal and plant life in pristine natural habitats.11
Many authors refer to these side effects in order to explain the ineffec-
tiveness of US drug policy. Despite spending billions of dollars and despite
sending US agents around the world and even invading other countries, as
happened in Panama in 1989, domestic drug prices in the US are relatively
low, purity is relatively high, and drugs are freely available.12 Policy ineffec-
tiveness partially results from the drug policy side effects mentioned above.
The displacement of the drug industry means that successful instances of drug
supply reduction are temporary. Violence, nationalism, corruption, and turf
battles obstruct the work of US agents on the ground.
In addition to these policy side effects, numerous other factors contribute
to the ineffectiveness of US foreign drug control efforts. These include the
poverty of rural populations and the profitability of illicit crops; the sorry
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state of security forces in many developing countries and the considerable
means available to traffickers; weak anti-drug norms; the dependency of some
countries on revenues from the drug trade and countervailing interests of the
governments of these countries; the fact that most value is added to drugs
in consuming regions and not at the source; and economic transition and
liberalization facilitating illicit transactions.
Analyzing these factors is scientifically fascinating and politically impor-
tant, since it shows why US drug policies fail to reach their objective of supply
reduction. However, the focus on policy ineffectiveness comes at a cost. In-
stead of explaining side effects, most scholars refer to side effects in order to
explain policy ineffectiveness. Hence, with the notable exceptions of human-
rights abuses and a weaker democratic control of armed forces,13 side effects
are accorded low analytical priority, even though they are veritable research
topics in their own right.
The aim of this article is to correct this analytical bias. A focus on US
foreign policy and the displacement of the drug industry is warranted because
displacement is a particularly problematic side effect. When the drug industry
moves to a new location, violence, corruption, and other drug-related prob-
lems move along with it. Hence, understanding and explaining displacement
sheds light on increasing drug problems in general. Instead of accepting a
priori that displacement is a consequence of US foreign drug policies, this
article sets out to examine whether this has been the case and how the un-
derlying mechanism of displacement looks like. The next section discusses
shortcomings of research on the displacement of the drug industry.
Shortcomings of research on the displacement of the drug industry
Displacement is a popular theme not only in the literature on US foreign
drug policy, but also in writings on US domestic drug policy. Michael Mass-
ing, for example, shows how greater police pressure on street-level dealers
in Spanish Harlem, New York City, in the early 1990s shifted drug sales off
one block and onto another.14 This episode reveals the limits of the domes-
tic law enforcement and legal-sanction model. Internationally, drug industry
displacement reduces the effectiveness of this model as well. But whereas
the causal link between drug policies and drug industry responses is relatively
clear at the domestic level, causality is more difficult to establish when looking
at the drug issue in connection with foreign policies. Internationally, there are
more concurrent developments than domestically, and empirical complexity
makes it tricky to distinguish causes from effects, or to determine the causal
effect of a specific anti-drug program, which after all is only one stimulus
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among many others. Moreover, there is sometimes a complete lack of reliable
data.
Although these are formidable research problems, they should not lead
researchers to eschew a systematic analysis of displacement. Unfortunately,
the unwieldy nature of displacement, as well as specific research choices, lead
to a paradoxical situation: Researchers frequently refer to displacement with-
out actually studying it in depth. Some authors do not analyze displacement
in sufficient empirical detail, since their aim is to explain not displacement,
but policy ineffectiveness. Other authors examine only cases in which the US
subordinated drug control to other foreign policy interests. Last, some authors
try to anticipate future patterns of displacement. Due to the complexity of the
drug economy, however, these forward-looking extrapolations remain overly
vague. Before anticipating or even predicting the future, one has to understand
and explain the past.
Regarding the first point, many authors analyze displacement as only one of
many side effects, all of which explain policy ineffectiveness and underline the
‘collateral damage’ of coercion. Rensselaer Lee argues that US drug policies
have increased the number of trafficking groups in Colombia, have made some
traffickers switch from dealing in cocaine to dealing in heroin, and have led to
the displacement of the drug industry across the country.15 Hence, the analysis
focuses not only on displacement. Similarly, Pablo Dreyfus examines drug
production as one example of negative trans-border spillover processes.16 He
does not stop there, though, but also attempts to explain increases in migration
and violence, as well as changing threat perceptions of policymakers. Ron
Chepesiuk and Ted Carpenter mention empirical examples of displacement,
but also examine human rights violations, corruption, nationalism, and other
presumed negative side effects of US drug policies.17
In all of these works, side effects figure prominently, but the causation
of displacement does not. Similarly, in an otherwise brilliant analysis of the
impact of US-funded aerial crop eradication in Colombia, Betsy Marsh over-
simplifies matters when she likens displacement to a balloon.
Studies have repeatedly shown that forced eradication programs stimulate
farmers to move elsewhere and replant, induce growers to plant larger areas
of illicit crops in anticipation of eradication, and cause illegal drug produc-
tion to shift abroad in the classic balloon effect. [. . .] Just as attempting to
flatten an inflated balloon will cause the air to spread out in all directions,
successful eradication in one area temporarily lowers the supply, thereby
raising the price for the illicit crop and stimulating production elsewhere.
For example, when Mexico suppressed marijuana production it blossomed
in Colombia. When Turkey suppressed opium production, it sprang up in
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Mexico. [. . .] When Bolivia and Peru suppressed coca cultivation, produc-
tion migrated north to Colombia.18
Using a simple price mechanism based on an equilibrium of demand and
supply, according to which demand will always find its supply, is unsatisfac-
tory. Rather, scholars must reveal, to use Jon Elster’s words, the “cogs and
wheels”19 behind displacement and support their causal claims with more
empirical data. Yet in so far as data on displacement is provided, the reader is
often left with an array of explanatory factors and empirical examples. Paul
Stares, for example, provides a big picture of drug problems and drug policies
in which everything is interrelated.20 However, anyone who is interested in
displacement must know how things are interrelated.
To be sure, some works focus exclusively on the ‘balloon effect’. Ralph
Seccombe shows that US-Pakistani law enforcement cooperation in the early
1990s contributed to shifting the heroin industry to Afghanistan.21 Frank
Mora examines the impact of US drug policies on Brazil and South America’s
Southern Cone.22 However, these analyses are arguably too brief to provide a
convincing explanation of displacement. Moreover, the authors do not develop
hypotheses or models that could be applied to other cases and thus contribute
to a theorization of displacement.
A further shortcoming of research on displacement must be mentioned
here. Some authors who look at displacement focus on cases in which the
US has subordinated drug control to other foreign policy interests. In one
of the most renowned contributions to drug policy research, Alfred McCoy
convincingly argues that US coincidental and deliberate support for groups
benefiting from the drug trade, on the one hand, and US pressure on other
groups, on the other hand, have helped to spread drug production and traf-
ficking around the globe.23 Other researchers confirm that the globalization
of drug problems cannot be explained without looking at the often-sinister
role of the CIA and other US governmental players.24 However, although the
pragmatic handling of foreign policy priorities must be taken into account in
explaining displacement, the CIA and other agencies have at times formed
part of the coercive US drug control apparatus. Hence, one should not only
look at periods in which the US pursued what could be called “anti-anti-drug”
policies. Anti-drug policies merit equal attention.
A third shortcoming of the literature on displacement is that some authors
prefer analyzing the future rather than the past. Shona Morrison examines
economic, political, and social conditions conducive to the displacement of
illicit drug production.25 These conditions allow her to identify a range of
countries that may produce drugs in the future. Although innovative, this an-
ticipatory approach is over-deterministic. Displacement is complex and can
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be a result of numerous combinations of events and background conditions.
Therefore, extrapolating future trends by deducing the conditions conducive
to displacement leads to overly general, and sometimes meaningless, results.
Although one cannot exclude the possibility of Greece attracting drug pro-
duction in the future, analysts should rather show how Colombia has done so
in the past. The same criticism can be leveled against another work dealing
with the future.26 Attempting to identify countries’ vulnerability to attract the
illicit drug industry, the authors identify conditions that give rise to this form
of illicit activity. Since the set of conditions that make countries vulnerable
comprises 24 variables, the number of causal pathways along which displace-
ment can occur is immense. Again, complexity means that we are doomed to
know little about the future.
This section has sketched out shortcomings of research on the displacement
of the illicit drug industry. The next section proposes a causal mechanism for
understanding and explaining displacement.
A causal mechanism for understanding and explaining displacement
Theorizing with causal mechanisms has become increasingly popular over the
recent years for two reasons. First, mechanism-based research often provides
more fine-grained explanations than positivist approaches that try to formulate
social laws by observing regularities between presumed causes and effects.27
Barometers do respond to climatic changes, and many heavy smokers do die
of cancer, but it is not enough to say that the weather causes the barometer to
change and that smoking causes premature death. Rather, researchers have to
explain what happens inside the barometer or the human body. Theorizing with
causal mechanisms means providing a convincing account of links between
assumed effects and causes, i.e., to reveal the “cogs and wheels” driving
changes such as drug industry displacement. Although there are regularities
between US policy and the displacement of the drug industry, a detailed
analysis of the environment intervening between specific anti-drug initiatives
and displacement is needed in order to comprehend the causal role of these
initiatives. Mechanism-based theorizing explains a phenomenon by showing
that, in the absence of specific underlying forces that together constitute a
causal mechanism, a phenomenon would not have occurred, or would have
occurred along different spatial or temporal lines.28
The second reason for the increasing popularity of causal mechanisms is
closely related to the first: mechanisms can be formulated and ‘tested’ in a
way that leaves room for empirical complexity, and they do not reduce hu-
mans to variables – in contrast to standard positivist approaches. Many social
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phenomena – including drug industry displacement – can result from dynamic
and sometimes enigmatic causal chains, interaction effects, catalysts, contin-
gent conditions, different causal paths that lead to the same outcome (equi-
finality), or a simultaneous presence of different causal forces.29 Moreover,
human beings matter, and human action is full of surprises. Peter Hedstro¨m
and Richard Swedberg deserve credit for underlining what is often forgotten
in positivist social science research: “[I]t is actors and not variables who do
the acting.”30 Although there are regularities in human action (drug traffickers
normally try to avoid being caught), behavior hinges on too many personal and
environmental factors to formulate a predictive, social law (evasion strategies
of members of a trafficking network depend, for example, on the structure of
the network). Furthermore, variable-based theorizing implies that an assumed
cause X and an assumed effect Y are independent from one another and that X
precedes Y in time.31 But this positivist notion of causality is a straightjacket
for researchers analyzing phenomena such as drug industry displacement that
are characterized by non-linear complexity. Positivist “‘manipulability’ think-
ing”32 is inappropriate when multiple factors blend into one another.
This article espouses a notion of causal mechanisms, causality, and expla-
nation that leaves room for interpretation. It is not so much concerned with
variables, but rather looks at background conditions and rules. The ability of
drug entrepreneurs to adapt to law enforcement pressure, for example, is not so
much a variable, but rather a background condition activated whenever states
apply pressure on traffickers. Analyzing displacement means understanding
these and other rules of the illicit drug industry. Moreover, interaction ef-
fects must be taken into account. Law enforcement operations can alter the
structure of the illicit drug industry, but industry changes also influence law
enforcement operations. Effects can thus become causes.33 Instead of asking
a narrow ‘why-question’ focusing on the ‘independent variables’ driving drug
industry displacement, this article asks a ‘how-possible-question’.34 Which
factors, conditions, and processes allow displacement to occur? Answers to
such ‘how-possible-questions’ are explanatory as well – positivism does not
hold a monopoly on explanation.
The causal mechanism that helps to understand and explain displacement
is composed of several elements that are deduced from the literature on US
foreign policy in general and US foreign drug policy in particular. It reads as
follows: US anti-drug initiatives contribute to the displacement of the illicit
coca/cocaine industry because the US applies pressure selectively, because
the drug industry is decentralized and thus able to respond flexibly to law
enforcement pressure, and because drug producing and transit states have
weak law enforcement capacities. In addition, contingent conditions are likely
to influence the outcome of US anti-drug initiatives.
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A particular foreign policy strategy or decision is the vantage point for
analyzing its consequences. In order to be able to speak of displacement as a
side effect of US foreign drug policy, one must show that the US has caused,
or at least significantly contributed, to displacement. Second, one must assess
whether a foreign policy is implemented comprehensively or selectively. The
penchant of US policymakers to accord drug control a lower priority than
other foreign policy interests, or to apply pressure locally, is well-known and
has often contributed to displacement.
The third element of the causal mechanism pertains to the structure of
the drug industry. Numerous actors are simultaneously engaged in coca and
poppy cultivation, cocaine and heroin production, and drug trafficking. Many
countries offer conditions suitable for drug productions and trafficking. More-
over, the number of smuggling routes is limitless, and many actors compete
for market shares. Since the drug industry lacks a center of gravity,35 ele-
ments falling prey to law enforcement can easily be replaced. But even taking
out individual elements is often challenging due to the network structure of
trafficking groups that operate much more flexibly than governments do.36
The fourth element of the causal mechanism, weak law enforcement capac-
ities in drug producing and transit states, is a generic category that manifests
itself in several ways, including a weak governmental control over the na-
tional territory; the tendency of many drug producing and transit states to
subordinate drug control to other interests such as the fight against insur-
gents; corruption; insufficient financial, logistical, and personnel resources;
and a lack of cooperation among state agencies. All these factors have in the
past undermined the effectiveness of US foreign drug policy and provide a
fertile ground for displacement.
In addition to these factors, understanding and explaining displacement
means to look at unforeseeable, idiosyncratic, contingent conditions. One
could argue that including these factors in a causal mechanism makes it im-
possible to assess the plausibility of a mechanism since any event or process
found in the course of empirical research can be considered contingent and
would thus be part of the initial explanatory framework. However, not leaving
analytical space for contingent conditions means underestimating the multi-
causal, unforeseeable nature of displacement. There is always some event or
process, which may or may not be related to US foreign drug policy, that
exerts some causal influence on displacement.
One could also raise the objection that the causal mechanism proposed here
lacks linearity. Ideally, a causal mechanism posits different explanatory factors
influencing an eventual outcome in a chronological fashion. Displacement is
more complex, however. Numerous background conditions, idiosyncrasies,
and explanatory factors may operate simultaneously or in a random order.
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They can also interact with one another and reinforce each other. This means
that although displacement can be studied as a chronological sequence of
events, the underlying causality of displacement cannot be studied in this
manner.
This article first analyzes a sequence of events by looking at the empiri-
cal chronology of displacement. Examining whether a US anti-drug initiative
coincided with displacement provides a first clue towards understanding and
explaining displacement. If, for example, displacement had already begun be-
fore the implementation of a foreign policy initiative, the initiative is unlikely
to have singularly caused displacement, but probably only contributed to a
process that was already underway. As a second step, this article examines
each element of the initial causal mechanism in a non-chronological fashion.
Hence, this article adopts a two-step approach for understanding and explain-
ing displacement; the first step is chronological and the second analytical.
For both of these steps, the methodology of process tracing is used. Pro-
cess tracing helps to identify “the intervening causal process – the causal
chain or causal mechanism” between assumed causes and effects.37 While
mechanism-based theorizing offers a promising ontological framework for
studying side effects of foreign drug policies, process tracing is a suitable
methodology. Standard positivist methods often falter when data is missing
or unreliable, as is the case with side effects of foreign policy. Process tracing,
in contrast, allows the researcher to infer from multiple weak pieces of evi-
dence. It transforms scholars into detectives who pursue “several suspects and
clues, constructing possible chronologies and causal paths backward from the
crime scene and forward from the last known whereabouts of the suspects.”38
To be sure, the clandestine nature of drug trafficking and the secrecy of many
anti-drug operations mean that not all black boxes can be illuminated and
alternative explanations ruled out. But mentioning and analyzing these black
boxes and alternative explanations adds value to drug policy research, since
the assertion that US foreign drug policy leads to side effects is often made
too easily.
This article focuses on the Air Bridge Denial Program (ABDP), a US
attempt to reduce drug supplies in South American source countries in the
1990s.39 In the first part, the empirical analysis traces the chronology of the
ABDP and the restructuring of the South American drug industry. The second
part examines each element of the initial causal mechanism, as well as black
boxes and alternative explanations. The conclusion discusses the theoretical
and practical implications of the findings.
The article draws on official publications, press reports, secondary litera-
ture, fieldwork in South America, and publications of activist-research insti-
tutions such as the Transnational Institute and the Washington Office on Latin
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America that have established themselves as reliable sources of information.
Generally, the clandestine nature of drug trafficking, state secrecy provisions,
and vested interests of information providers restrict the validity and quality
of information. It is therefore pivotal to compare data from various sources
and examine the reliability of information sources wherever necessary.
The Air Bridge Denial Program
Numerous authors have studied the domestic conditions in the US that give
rise to coercive attempts to reduce drug supplies from abroad. These include
resentment and prejudices40 as well as the opportunistic behavior of bureau-
cracies and politicians who, similar to World War I generals, demand ever
more troops to attack the enemy even though it is clear that the attack strategy
is futile.41 In their attempts to justify coercive drug policies, policymakers ar-
gue that illicit drugs impose significant human and economic costs on the US.
In addition, many US policymakers argue that leftist insurgents and groups
labeled terrorists finance their operations through drugs. These groups can
endanger the lives of US citizens based in drug producing and transit states
and can also threaten perceived US economic interests, for example when
they bomb oil pipelines or force US companies to take expensive security
precautions.
For all these reasons, the US federal government has been leading a “hun-
dred years’ war” on drugs.42 From the 1980s this war has been waged mainly
in South America. Whereas previously, heroin and cannabis had been the
main drugs of concern, from the mid-1980s the drug that caused the most
concern in the US was cocaine, and particularly crack cocaine. Cocaine came
exclusively from Latin America, which explains the US focus on the region.
Moreover, the fact that most US policymakers constructed drug supplies as
a national security threat helps to explain the official thrust on coercion.43
In Latin America, and most prominently in Colombia, drug traffickers had
established a thriving industry that fed the US demand for cocaine.44
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the structure of the South American drug
industry was quite simple. Colombian traffickers came to Peru and Bolivia,
where most of the world’s coca grew. There, they bought cocaine base paste
(pasta ba´sica de cocaina) from middlemen or coca farmers.45 Subsequently,
the traffickers transported the coca paste back to Colombia, where they trans-
formed it into cocaine bound for the US and Europe (although some cocaine
was processed in Peru and Bolivia). The most common means of transport
used by traffickers between Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia were small aircraft.
Already in the 1970s, the flamboyant Colombian drug trafficker Carlos Lehder,
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who was eventually extradited to the US, had made extensive use of aerial
drug smuggling. In the words of former US chief prosecutor Robert Merkle,
“Lehder was to cocaine trafficking what Henry Ford was to automobiles.”46
In the 1980s, other traffickers followed Lehder’s example.
One of the aims of the ABDP was to destroy this drug smuggling air bridge
between the Bolivian and Peruvian coca fields and the Colombian cocaine
laboratories. By interdicting planes, US planners hoped to cut off Peruvian
and Bolivian coca farmers from their customers and, due to a resulting fall
in coca prices, make the farmers give up illicit cultivation. In Colombia,
traffickers would have fewer materials (coca and coca base paste) at their
disposal for producing cocaine. As a consequence, less cocaine would be
produced in Colombia and exported to the US. Decreasing cocaine supplies,
so the logic went, would translate into higher US cocaine prices, lower purity,
and diminishing drug availability. Eventually, domestic drug consumption
would decline in the US.47 As researchers of the RAND Corporation have
convincingly shown, this logic is flawed, among other reasons because most
value is added to drugs on US streets and not in source countries.48 This means
that traffickers can easily offset losses in source countries by paying more to
coca farmers or by financing new coca fields.
Numerous actors in the US and South America were involved in the im-
plementation of the ABDP, using various military hardware and intelligence
systems.49 US federal departments that contributed resources to air interdic-
tion included the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies, such as
the Defense Information Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the
National Security Agency, were involved as well.50 From 1992 onward, the
air interdiction effort was directed by the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)
of the Pentagon’s Southern Command (SouthCom). The JAOC was based at
Howard Air Force Base in Panama and, from 1999, in Key West, Florida.51
Monitoring the gigantic South American, Central American, and Caribbean
airspace, the JAOC played a central role in the air interdiction effort. Since the
US had to cooperate with Latin American states, the JAOC hosted Latin Amer-
ican liaison officers with whom US personnel conducted joint surveillance
flights. Whenever US surveillance planes flew over the airspace of another
country, a military officer from that country had to be on board.52
The US used an impressive array of technology and hardware for air
interdiction, including C-130, P-3 Orion, and E-3 Sentry AWACS (Airborne
Warning and Control System) surveillance aircrafts. These airplanes, as well
as radar stations on the ground, provided the US command center and the
security forces of Andean states with real-time intelligence. In addition, US
F-16 fighter jets helped to identify aircraft. C-130 transport planes and C-27
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Spartan refueling planes were deployed for air interdiction. Once the air forces
of Andean states had received information on suspicious flights, they would
force the planes to the ground. There, they would be searched for possible
drug loads. If the pilots of the suspicious planes did not respond to warning
signals, planes would be shot down.53
The Air Bridge Denial Program can be divided into two phases, the first of
which lasted from the later 1980s to 1995 and the second from 1995 to 2001.
In the following, these two phases are discussed chronologically. The analysis
shows that the ABDP, particularly during its main phase, was accompanied
by the displacement of coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia, an increase in
Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine production, and a dispersion of drug trafficking
routes.
The early phase of the Air Bridge Denial Program
Initially, the US tried to interdict trafficking planes in a rather piece-meal
fashion. In the framework of the 1986 Operation Blast Furnace, the Reagan
administration sent around 160 US personnel, as well as six Black Hawk he-
licopters, to Bolivia to put pressure on traffickers who operated mainly in the
Beni and Santa Cruz areas.54 In the course of the five-month operation, US
officials argued that air interdiction was necessary to cut the link between traf-
fickers buying coca and coca paste and peasants supplying these materials.55
In 1987, then-US Customs Commissioner William Van Raab suggested that
the US Air Force should be permitted to shoot down suspicious smuggling
aircraft that failed to respond to warning signals.56 Although this proposal
was presumably not heeded immediately, air interdiction efforts were stepped
up. In the framework of Operation Snowcap, which began in spring 1987 and
lasted well into the 1990s, the US tried to reduce cocaine supplies by training
and equipping security forces from several South American countries and by
supporting their operations against traffickers and coca farmers on the ground.
The US government claimed that 26 trafficking aircraft had been seized during
the first two years of Snowcap.57
Nevertheless, aerial drug smuggling continued. In the later 1980s in Peru,
it was estimated that between two and five aircraft landed on clandestine
Peruvian airstrips every day – sometimes only for ten minutes –, picked up
between 800 and 2,500 pounds of coca paste, and flew back to Colombia.
Besides the traffickers, most of which were from the ‘cartels’ of Medellı´n
and Cali, the main beneficiaries of the air bridge were the Maoist rebel group
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Peruvian security forces. Accord-
ing to scholar and former military advisor Sewall Menzel, whose insightful
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writings on the South American drug industry are partially based on personal
observations, traffickers paid the Senderistas and the Peruvian security forces
between $3,000 and $8,000 each for every drug load.58
From 1990, in the framework of the Andean Initiative, the US significantly
increased drug control efforts in the Andes. In July 1990, it began to share
intelligence on aerial drug trafficking with Colombia and Peru59 and spon-
sored the installation of ground-based radar stations, which complemented the
intelligence gathered by ground forces and reconnaissance planes. Radar sta-
tions were installed in various locations in Peru and Colombia,60 and possibly
also in Bolivia and Ecuador, although little is known about the installation of
radar stations in these countries. The radar stations helped to spot suspicious
flights and contributed to the implementation of several operations against
drug traffickers in the early 1990s. The most important ones were Operations
Snowcap, Safe Haven, Ghost Zone, and Support Justice.
Not much is known about the details of these operations and how they
were related to each other,61 not least because they were split up into different
phases and shrouded in secrecy. What matters here is that these operations
put some pressure on traffickers. In Bolivia, a raid on the town of Santa
Ana de Yacuma, undertaken in June 1991 as part of Operation Safe Haven,
reportedly led to the arrest of over 50 suspects, the destruction of 15 cocaine
laboratories, and the seizure of 42 aircraft, which may have been half of all
trafficking aircraft operating in Bolivia.62
In neighbouring Peru, security forces supported by US ground radar,
AWACS, and P-3 aircraft intercepted suspicious planes and destroyed clan-
destine airstrips. Operation Support Justice III, which lasted from fall 1991 to
spring 1992, led to the interception of an estimated 55 unscheduled aircraft,
six of which may have been en route to Colombia with drugs on board.63 In
one of the many accidents accompanying the ABDP, the Peruvian air force
shot down a civilian aircraft non involved in smuggling on 9 July 1991, killing
17 passengers.64
Sometimes, developments on the drug markets were positive from the US
perspective. In late 1989 and early 1990, for example, coca prices decreased
significantly.65 Lower prices coincided with a brief slump in coca cultivation
(at least in Bolivia) and a decline in aerial trafficking. In Peru, trafficking may
have declined from five to six smuggling flights per day to six per week.66
However, as shown further below, it is unlikely that these changes were a
result of the Air Bridge Denial Program. Rather, domestic developments in
Colombia can explain these developments. In any case, success was short-
lived. By mid-1992, air smuggling was in full swing again. An estimated 20
planes per day flew drugs from Peru to Colombia.67 Moreover, by late 1990,
Bolivian coca prices and coca cultivation had recovered.
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Between 1992 and 1995, US-sponsored interdiction in Bolivia, Peru, and
Colombia was frustrating for the US officials involved, since operations were
ineffective and hampered by numerous implementation problems. In Bolivia,
US forces and their Bolivian counterparts tried to interdict trafficking flights to
and from the Chapare´, as well as the delivery of precursor chemicals needed
for drug production, during Operation Ghost Zone, which began in March
1992.68 The operation formed part of the ‘kingpin’ strategy. By applying
pressure on drug ‘kingpins’, the US hoped to do significant damage to the
drug industry. Although Ghost Zone made life a little difficult for Colombian
traffickers, they continued to fly to the Chapare´ and supply Colombia with
sufficient raw materials for cocaine production. The Colombians paid in cash
and thus provided farmers with a vital source of income.69
In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori surprised the US with his ‘autogolpe’
on 5 April 1992, which gave him quasi-dictatorial powers and led to the
imposition of US sanctions. To make matters worse, on 24 April 1992, the
Peruvian air force fired at a US surveillance aircraft, killing one crewman and
injuring several others. The plane, which had been flying in international air
space, had been on its way to Panama after completing a mission over Peru’s
main coca-growing area, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). As a consequence
of the incident, and to underline demands for a return to democracy, the US
suspended aerial surveillance operations in Peru and the delivery of anti-drug
aid to the country.70 Meanwhile, Fujimori declared a state of emergency in
the UHV and ordered the air force to reestablish control over clandestine
airstrips. In September 1992, the US and Peru resumed aerial interdiction and
laid out procedures for avoiding accidental shoot-downs. In January 1993,
Operation Support Justice IV was begun, which used several ground and air
radar stations in Peru.71
In Colombia, air interdiction was undertaken as well. During Operation
Support Justice III and IV, the Colombian air force interdicted suspicious
planes with the help of US surveillance aircraft and ground radar near the bor-
der with Peru. Although many planes may have been seized on the ground,
aerial interdiction was severely hampered by the fact that Colombian security
forces did not implement a policy that would have allowed them to shoot down
suspicious planes.72 But on 2 March 1994, Colombian President Gaviria said
that security forces would begin to shoot down planes that had no flight plan
and refused to land after receiving warning signals. As a consequence, on 1
May 1994, the Clinton administration announced a suspension of aerial intel-
ligence sharing with Colombia since it feared an accidental shoot-down and
liability claims against US personnel.73 Many in the US Congress criticized
the suspension of intelligence cooperation. One even spoke of the “the most
significant retreat since George Washington retreated from New York during
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our revolution.”74 Critics of Clinton’s decision referred to indications showing
that the suspension of intelligence sharing allowed Colombian traffickers to
increase the number of flights, transport smaller amounts of drugs, fly at day-
time, and remain on the ground for a longer period of time.75 It was not before
December 1994 that the Clinton administration announced that US officials
would be exempted from liability claims in case of civilian deaths due to aerial
interdiction, given certain conditions. This legal clarification was crucial for
the resumption of large-scale aerial interdiction from 1995 onwards.76
As shown further below, attempts to assess the impact of the ABDP on
the structure of the South American drug industry are hampered by empir-
ical black boxes. However, there is little doubt that the program during its
early phase did not improve US drug problems, which continued to be signif-
icant.77 More importantly in the present context, the program’s early phase
coincided with a restructuring of the South American drug industry. While
coca cultivation decreased particularly in Peru (although a slight increase was
registered in 1995), it began to increase in Colombia, as illustrated by the
chart and the table in the annex. The hectare figures for Colombia read as
follows: 37,100 (1992), 39,700 (1993), 44,700 (1994), and 50,900 (1995).78
Increasing Colombian coca cultivation, which became much more dramatic
during the main phase of the Air Bridge Denial Program, showed that Colom-
bia was no longer only a country of cocaine production, but that traffickers
increasingly procured coca in Colombia and thereby lowered transport costs
and interdiction risks. The next section examines the main phase of the Air
Bridge Denial Program.
The main phase of the air bridge denial program
From 1995, the Clinton administration effectively granted immunity to US
personnel involved in any accidents occurring in the course of aerial interdic-
tion. From an international law perspective, the new legislation was highly
dubious.79 But Clinton was under pressure from the Republican-dominated
Congress and thus felt forced to reinvigorate Andean drug control programs.80
Besides, Fujimori’s election victory in 1995 made it easier for the US gov-
ernment to justify close anti-drug cooperation. This cooperation was largely
based on an alliance between US government and CIA officials on the one
hand, and Fujimori’s sinister advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, on the other
hand. Montesinos’ shady business deals and human rights violations cast a
large shadow over US-sponsored air interdiction.81
In 1995, US and Andean security forces again began to share information
on aerial smuggling, and the US installed or made operative ground radar
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stations in Peru, Colombia, and maybe elsewhere. In October 1995, Operation
Green Clover was formally launched. Directed by SouthCom, the operation
brought around 3,000 US military personnel together with South and Central
American security forces. In Peru, staff of CIA-contracted companies flew in
aircraft owned by the US military and passed information about suspicious
flights on the Peruvian security forces. These companies were only part of
a large spectrum of actors involved in the ABDP’s implementation in the
Western Hemisphere.82
In January 1996, source-country control policies received another boost
when Clinton appointed retired four-star General Barry McCaffrey as direc-
tor of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. While still head of South-
Com, McCaffrey had led Operation Green Clover. Under his guidance, the
US now increased its anti-drug aid particularly to Peru, from $15 million
in 1995 to $19 million (1996), $26 million (1997), $32 million (1998), $75
million (1999), and finally $80 million in the year 2000. In Colombia, the
anti-drug effort was complicated by the decision of the Clinton administra-
tion to ‘decertify’ Colombia in 1996 and 1997 following allegations that the
1994 election campaign of President Ernesto Samper had been sponsored
by traffickers from Calı´. Nevertheless, the US continued to conduct anti-
drug operations together with the Colombian security forces, particularly the
Colombian National Police.
In April 1996, the Pentagon launched Operation Laser Strike. This suc-
cessor program to Green Clover involved the security forces of the US and
nine other countries (albeit in different stages) and the use of ground-based
radar and various surveillance aircraft.83 US officials argued that Laser Strike
was more effective than Green Clover since it better integrated air interdiction
with riverine and ground operations and involved a greater number of coun-
tries, including the traditionally recalcitrant Brazil.84 In 1996, McCaffrey and
others praised the air interdiction effort. ONDCP official William Bonzin, for
example, said in Congress in September 1996:
The results of this multinational, cooperative effort have been stunning.
The so-called “air bridge” between Peru and Colombia saw a greater than
50 percent reduction of flights as aircraft were intercepted and, in some
cases, shot down. Approximately 50 narco-trafficking aircraft operating
along the Peru/Colombia air bridge have been forced down and seized, or
shot down. The cost of shipment has increased fivefold as pilots demand
more money as their personal risk increased dramatically. Movement was
reduced so drastically that there was a glut of coca base on the market and
the price of the product being shipped [from Peru to Colombia] fell by 50
percent overall and by as much as 80 percent in some areas.85
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These and other claims of success are dubious. First, and as shown below,
there is no agreement as to how many trafficking flights were intercepted.
Second, during the second half of the 1990s, US cocaine consumption was
fairly stable, not least due to stable cocaine prices, purity, and availability.86
Third, and most importantly, the structure of the South American coca/cocaine
industry was changing in several ways.
The first notable change was a fluctuation of coca prices in Peru. Be-
tween January and September 1995, the price for a kilo of coca leaves in the
UHV decreased from $3 to $0.4, and the price of a kilo of coca paste from
$850 to $100.87 In 1996, prices were still relatively low, but then they slowly
recovered,88 reaching high levels again toward the end of the decade.
Second, Peruvian coca cultivation declined further and Colombian culti-
vation increased dramatically (see the chart and the table in the annex). The
figures for Peruvian coca cultivation (in hectares) read as follows: 115,300
(1995); 94,400 (1996); 68,800 (1997); 51,000 (1998); and 38,700 (1999). In
2000, 34,100 hectares of Peruvian land were used for coca cultivation, a sig-
nificant decline compared to the levels of the early 1990s.89 While this decline
delighted US government officials,90 Colombian coca cultivation increased,
growing from 57,200 hectares in 1996 to 79,500 (1997), 101,800 (1998),
122,500 (1999), and 136,200 in the year 2000.
Rising Colombian cultivation almost perfectly compensated lower cul-
tivation in other countries. Between 1992 and 2002, “the total area under
illicit coca bush cultivation has been remarkably constant at around 200,000
hectares per year”, as researchers of the Transnational Institute point out.91
This fact makes it tempting to compare the coca/cocaine industry to a bal-
loon whose air shifts elsewhere as a consequence of air interdiction. Af-
ter all, at least in this case, the quantity of air inside the balloon has been
essentially the same. However, the balloon metaphor is less useful when
considering the fact that external pressure was applied not only through
air interdiction, and that displacement resulted not only from external pres-
sure, but also from developments on drug markets that were not directly
related to US foreign policy. These causal factors are discussed further
below.
A third indicator of market changes is the vertical integration of the Pe-
ruvian and Bolivian drug trade. From the mid-1990s, these two traditional
coca-cultivating countries, and particularly Bolivia, began to produce sig-
nificant amounts of cocaine. In Peru, coca prices may have recovered from
1996 onwards since non-Colombian buyers filled the gap left by the Colom-
bians. In 1995, the State Department noted that cocaine produced in Peru was
sold without the involvement of Colombian traffickers,92 and in early 1996,
Peruvians reportedly began to sell coca products to Bolivians.93 Partly as a
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consequence of the latter development, cocaine made up 61 percent of coca
products seized in Bolivia in 1995, whereas the year before, its share of the
total had been only nine percent.94
The fourth element showing the restructuring of the Andean drug trade
was the use of new smuggling routes and methods. Some traffickers contin-
ued using traditional flight routes despite the ABDP.95 But many traffickers
presumably avoided air trafficking and instead used rivers, the Pacific Ocean,
large roads, including the Pan-American Highway, or even jungle paths.96
Yet since land and riverine drug smuggling was time-consuming, costly, and
risky due to higher chances of interdiction as well as banditry, it is likely
that traffickers responded to the ABDP mainly by dispersing aerial smug-
gling routes. Some avoided flying over the Ecuadorian jungle and rerouted
their flights to the coastal areas, while others avoided using the Ecuadorian
airspace and flew over other countries instead.97 One of these was Brazil,
which saw more cocaine paste and cocaine imports from Peru and Bolivia.
From Brazil, drugs either fed a rising domestic demand or were exported to
the US and Europe. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) con-
firmed the dispersion process when it reported in 1996 that traffickers were
responding to the ABDP by smuggling coca paste on land routes or rivers
to aircraft at clandestine airstrips in the tri-border areas of Brazil, Peru, and
Colombia.98 Traffickers also used Venezuela and other countries for exporting
drugs, laundering money, and buying precursor chemicals.
Towards the end of the decade, air interdiction underwent significant
changes. With the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act of October
1998, the US Congress once more increased funding for anti-drug programs
in source countries. In May 1999, Howard Air Force Base in Panama had
to be closed as the government of Panama assumed control over the Canal
Zone. SouthCom facilities were transferred to Florida and Puerto Rico, and
so-called Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) were established in Ecuador,
Aruba, and Curac¸ao.99 From these FOLs, the US operated several types of
aircraft, as well as intelligence equipment such as radar facilities and large
antennae. FOLs could cover huge geographical spaces and were considered
cheaper than Howard Air Force Base. Counter-drug missions were probably
only one type of activity undertaken with the help of FOLs. As a matter of fact,
air interdiction became increasingly intertwined with anti-guerilla operations.
Following the July 1999 crash of a US reconnaissance plane in Colombia, one
US source said: “We’re not supposed to be monitoring guerillas, but that’s what
they were doing.”100
By 1997/1998, US planners believed that the Peruvian-Colombian drug
smuggling air bridge had largely been destroyed. In May 1998, they therefore
suspended AWACS and P-3 Orion surveillance flights over Peru and instead
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used the equipment to survey aerial smuggling inside Colombia. As the US
embassy in Lima objected to this move, the Clinton administration announced
in August 1998 that P-3 flights would resume.101 However, by that time the
urgency that had marked air interdiction in the mid-1990s had vanished. Peru-
vian coca cultivation was relatively low, despite a modest increase that was not
least due to high coca prices, and aerial smuggling seemed much reduced. In
Bolivia, developments were positive as well from a US perspective. Despite
the fierce resistance of coca farmers, President Hugo Banzer implemented
Plan Dignity, an aggressive coca eradication scheme that led to the halving of
Bolivian coca cultivation and possibly the reduction of a third of the country’s
cocaine production between 1998 and 2001.102
In Colombia, however, the situation was troubling. Record levels of coca
cultivation, cocaine production, and drug smuggling, as well as the fact that
most of the heroin consumed on the US East Coast came from Colombia,
helps to explain the US focus on the country. In addition, the US interest in
exploiting Colombia’s natural resources, and particularly its oil wealth,103
coupled with the threat posed by ever-stronger guerilla forces, led to an
increase in US aid to the Colombian government, and eventually to Plan
Colombia.
On 20 April 2001, the Air Bridge Denial Program ended tragically when
the Peruvian air force shot down a civilian aircraft over Peruvian airspace
carrying a US missionary family, killing the wife and her infant daughter.
The shoot-down caused outrage in the US also because the Peruvians had
received support from a private US military company hired by the CIA.
As part of the debate over the outsourcing of military activities, a former
US planner of counter-drug missions said that “[t]here wasn’t one person
aboard that [CIA-commissioned] plane sworn to uphold the Constitution of
the United States. They were all. . . businessmen!”104 Following the shoot-
down, the White House suspended the ABDP.105
Until this point, the article has provided a chronological analysis of the
Air Bridge Denial Program. The program began in the later 1980s and ended
in 2001. Until 1995, the program was implemented relatively sporadically.
During this early phase, coca cultivation began to increase in Colombia
and decrease in Peru. The main phase of the ABDP saw an acceleration
of this trend, as well the verticalization of the Peruvian and Bolivian drug
industries, and the use of new trafficking routes and methods. Thus, dis-
placement did occur, and it coincided roughly with the ups and downs of
air interdiction. However, saying that displacement was a consequence of
the ABDP would oversimplify things. To better understand and explain dis-
placement, the next section refers to the causal mechanism developed in the
introduction.
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A causal mechanism of displacement
The initial causal mechanism, which helps to understand and explain displace-
ment, is composed of several elements: the selectivity of US foreign policy,
the flexibility of the drug industry, problems of drug producing and transit
countries to implement laws against drugs, and contingent conditions. The
following discussion examines these factors, as well as empirical black boxes
and alternative explanations.
The selectivity of US foreign policy
Several characteristics of the US-sponsored air interdiction effort contributed
to displacement. These include coordination and legal problems, the appli-
cation of law enforcement pressure on a local instead of a countrywide or
region-wide basis, and a focus on coercion instead of non-coercive strategies.
However, it must also be said that the US did try to prevent Colombia from
becoming the world’s prime coca cultivation country.
As discussed above, US concerns about liability claims in case of acciden-
tal shoot-downs led to the suspension of air interdiction during the ABDP’s
early phase and thus provided traffickers with windows of opportunity. US
agencies found it difficult to coordinate their response to the shoot-down poli-
cies of the Colombian and Peruvian governments. Some agencies and officials
demanded a suspension of interdiction and others a continuation.106 Moreover,
US agencies failed to agree on the military hardware used for interdiction, with
various agencies favoring the use of their respective weapons and intelligence
systems.107 Often, the material used was inadequate for aerial interdiction. In
1993, for example, the General Accounting Office complained that “[s]ensors
designed to detect large supersonic aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines
are less proficient against low-flying planes and small wooden boats.”108 Some
pivotal US players in the interdiction effort, such as the US military and the
DEA, at times were barely on speaking terms with one another.109
Not least because of these coordination problems, US agencies failed to
apply law enforcement pressure in a holistic fashion, thus allowing traffick-
ers to escape or circumvent aerial interdiction.110 As Sewall Menzel writes,
Washington implemented
a series of operations and programs, sometimes operating in tandem and
sometimes not. Highlighting this fact was General Fred Woerner’s an-
nual SOUTHCOM conference on Latin American issues in early 1988.
When queried at the conference if the Department of State had an
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anti-drug strategy for the Andean region, Ann Wroblesky, the Department
of State’s Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters
stated openly to those in attendance that: “We have no strategy; we just
operate!”111
This failure to arrive at common strategies and to implement these strate-
gies across South America hampered Washington’s anti-drug effort at various
times and places. The DEA in Bolivia sometimes did not receive informa-
tion about US operations in other countries,112 and operations in Peru were
sometimes not properly coordinated with operations elsewhere.113 Even in
Peru, the fact that the US focused on the UHV until the mid-1990s meant
that coca cultivation in other parts of the country experienced relatively little
interference.114 During the ABDP’s main phase, US agencies were sometimes
unaware of the lessons learned during earlier interdiction operations, appar-
ently also because of a fast turnover of personnel and the obligation to destroy
documents.115 In Colombia, US supply reduction policies suffered from the
late arrival of spare aircraft and helicopter parts.116
While selectivity contributed to displacement, one should not overstate the
point. After all, the US was very active in Colombia at the time when coca
cultivation shifted to that country. The ABDP’s main phase roughly coincided
with a historically unprecedented aerial fumigation campaign. The Samper
administration, ostracized by the US, was under pressure to act as a loyal ally
in the ‘war on drugs’ and thus agreed to constantly increase fumigation.117
Yet despite an intensive spraying campaign by the Colombian National Police,
Washington’s closest cooperation partner in the second half of the 1990s, 2.5
times more coca was cultivated in 1998 than in 1992.118 Thus, displacement
occurred despite large-scale US efforts to reduce drug supplies that cost US
taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.
Last, US drug policy was selective in the sense that priority was given to
coercion. Washington largely considered drugs to be a matter for law enforce-
ment and the military, and not a social and development issue. Thus, most US
funds were invested into air interdiction, military operations on the ground,
or eradication. Although the US also invested substantial sums of money into
alternative development, the delivery of aid was often coupled to tight eradi-
cation deadlines and the threat of the use of force in case the deadlines were
not met. This strategy antagonized farmers and added to the impression that
the US did little to provide sustainable help to farmers who often lived in dire
conditions.119 Hence, poverty, which gives rise to the displacement of illicit
cultivation, persisted.
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The flexibility of the drug industry
To understand and explain the displacement of coca cultivation to Colombia,
the verticalization of the Bolivian and Peruvian drug industries, and the dis-
persion of trafficking routes, one must take into account the impressive ability
of traffickers to avoid interdiction. Frequently, the technology available to
traffickers was superior to that used by security forces. In the early 1990s,
the Peruvian air force did not have the means to fly and fight at nighttime
and to fly fast. Traffickers exploited this vulnerability by flying in the dark,
switching to fast two-engine planes, and flying below the levels covered by
radar stations.120 Moreover, they reduced interdiction risks and transport costs
by transporting large drug shipments and by flying in zigzag patterns, in the
shadow of large commercial aircraft and in groups of several planes that then
split up so as to confuse interdiction teams.121 They also avoided detection
from US ground radar stations in Peru and Bolivia by flying into countries
such as Ecuador and Brazil where radar coverage was less dense. Since money
was often less of a problem for some traffickers than for security forces, the
former were able to procure sophisticated technology, as described by Robert
Filippone:
[The traffickers] have state-of-the-art equipment, including satellite radios,
digital decryption devices, and voice privacy mechanisms, that makes it
difficult for even the U.S. armed forces to penetrate. [US] General Gorman
made this clear when he said, “I have seen equipment used on the aircraft
that fly between the United States and Colombia, and I can assure you
that it is more sophisticated and more facile than the equipment that I had
on my aircraft of the U.S. Air Force in the U.S. Southern Command”. He
went on to say that the government’s communication system is regularly
intercepted by the traffickers and that traffickers can track the movements
of armed forces units better than the respective commanders.122
To make matters worse for governments, simple means used by traffickers
were often sufficient for transporting drugs. These ranged from motorboats
and trucks to canoes, cars, and backpacks. The vastness of the Andean re-
gion, in combination with poorly equipped Andean security forces, offered
numerous options for dispersing trafficking routes.
Innovative behavior of traffickers also led to the verticalization of the Peru-
vian and Bolivian drug industries. In Peru, for example, Colombian traffickers
showed locals how to produce coca paste and how to operate drug laborato-
ries producing agua rica (liquefied cocaine base). This diversification of the
drug industry reduced costs as well as the risks of interdiction and seizure.123
Although ground operations may have been the main motivation behind the
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increase in Peruvian and Bolivian drug production, air interdiction probably
played a role as well.
In Colombia, traffickers induced peasants through threats or financial in-
centives to grow coca. The increase in Colombian cultivation reduced traf-
fickers’ dependence on Peruvian and Bolivian coca and thus made the drug
industry more efficient through a reduction of interdiction risks. However, it
is important to note that the increase in Colombian cultivation was not only
a result of a conscious strategy. For many smaller trafficking groups, it was a
necessity, since they did not have the means to fly to Peru and Bolivia to buy
coca paste.
Weak law enforcement
In addition to the selectivity of US foreign policy and the flexibility of the
drug industry, in order to understand and explain the displacement of the
drug industry one must also examine the ability of South American states to
implement laws against drugs. Weak law enforcement can manifest itself in
several ways. This section only looks at corruption and the failure of states to
control the national territory.
For obvious reasons, corruption is notoriously immune to systematic sci-
entific analysis. Still, there are indications that corruption hampered the air
interdiction effort and that it was conducive to displacement. In Bolivia in the
1980s, for example, traffickers apparently offered security forces and munici-
pal officers between $15,000 and $25,000 for a 72 h-long silence during which
the traffickers would land their aircraft, pick up drugs, and leave again.124 Sim-
ilarly, in Colombia, officials who were on the payroll of traffickers warned
the latter of raids in advance. During the 1992 Operation Support Justice,
air interdiction rates were presumably lowered because Colombian air con-
trollers operating at the country’s 497 legitimate airports passed information
about interdiction onto traffickers.125 And in Venezuela in the early 1990s, the
presidency of Carlos Andres Perez was rocked by allegations of corruption,
leading to coup attempts, which in turn led to the arrest of up to 2,500 air
force pilots and technicians.126 It is unlikely that traffickers would have failed
to take advantage of such opportunities.
A lack of territorial control was conducive to displacement as well. During
the first half of the 1990s, Peru counted almost 400 airports. Eighty of these
were outside of government control.127 This offered unique opportunities
to traffickers. These often struck alliances with Senderista guerillas, who
protected rural areas against incursions from security forces. As shown below,
the strength of Sendero Luminoso was greatly diminished during the second
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half of the 1990s. However, territorial control remained a problem, as indicated
by the statement of a US State Department official who, in February 1997,
commented on the difficulties the US and Peru encountered while trying to
establish a riverine interdiction program: “[Y]ou still have to deal with the
insurgency at night. What you are talking about is imposing control over areas
that the central Government has never controlled.”128 This meant that there
was no limit to the number of potential trafficking routes.
In Colombia, the drug industry was thriving not least because the gov-
ernment was unable to prevent strong rebel and paramilitary forces from
infiltrating or controlling sizeable parts of the national territory. Coca culti-
vation increased especially in areas controlled by the FARC, who often fired
at fumigation aircraft. However, the FARC’s main participation in the drug
industry was through the taxation of coca fields, as confirmed by the DEA.129
As shown in the next section, an explanation of the displacement of the drug
industry to Colombia must also take into account smaller trafficking groups
and paramilitaries.
Contingent conditions
Contingent conditions, which may or may not be related to US foreign pol-
icy, had an impact on drug industry displacement.130 Most importantly, law
enforcement operations in Colombia and a general restructuring of the Colom-
bian drug industry reduced the importance of the drug smuggling air bridge
between Peru and Colombia, contributed to an increase in Colombian coca
cultivation, and were conducive to the verticalization of the Bolivian and
Peruvian drug industries.
As shown above, aerial smuggling saw a brief decline in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. This decline can mainly be attributed to the fact that at that time,
and following the murder of Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos
Gala´n, the Medellı´n trafficking group, which was very active in aerial smug-
gling, had to keep a low profile. By the time the head of the Medellı´n cartel,
Pablo Escoba´r, was killed by security forces (on 2 December 1993), the rival
Cali group had already become the most powerful trafficking organization. It
specialized in corruption rather than violence and was probably responsible
for the bulk of aerial trafficking. The shrewd Cali traffickers also increased
coca cultivation in Colombia to make the drug industry more efficient and to
increase profits.
However, smaller trafficking groups played the main role in the vertical-
ization of the Colombian drug industry. Lacking control over international
trafficking networks and aerial technology, these ‘baby cartels’131 had to rely
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on Colombian raw material and thus induced peasants to plant coca.132 The
arrest of leading Cali traffickers in 1995 again greatly facilitated this ‘de-
mocratization’ of the Colombian drug industry. Moreover, and as mentioned
above, the increasing strength of the FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries led to
an increase in Colombian coca cultivation.
The rise of smaller trafficking groups and non-state armed forces was part
and parcel of the escalating Colombian conflict. The combination of societal
disintegration, relatively weak social norms against the use of violence, a
delegitimized state, poverty, and other conditions that were present in several
South American countries but particularly virulent in Colombia, provided a
fertile soil for drug production and trafficking.133
To understand and explain increasing Colombian coca cultivation and
decreasing Peruvian cultivation, as well as the verticalization of the drug
industry in Peru, one must take into account Peruvian contingencies as well.
In 1991, the fungus Fusarium Oxysporum appeared on coca fields in Peru and
soon destroyed an estimated 30 percent of the coca cultivated in the UHV. As a
consequence, cultivation increased along the Ucayali and Apurimac rivers, in
the Lower and Middle Huallaga Valleys, and other regions. In 1994, UHV coca
made up only 27 percent of total cultivation in Peru, a steep decline compared
to its previous share.134 These changes may well have posed problems to
traffickers transporting coca paste to Colombia, since traffickers now had to
fly to regions other than the UHV, incurring higher risks and costs. Moreover,
the spread of the fungus may have convinced some traffickers of the need to
increase cultivation in Colombia in order to reduce the risk of shortages in the
supply of raw material.
The dismantling of the main Shining Path network during the second half
of the 1990s proved significant as well. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Peruvian government, and particularly the military, was unwilling to eradicate
coca, correctly believing that eradication would increase Sendero’s popularity
among coca farmers.135 Thus, between 1989 and 1995, only coca seedbeds,
in contrast to mature plants, were eradicated.136 But the arrest of Shining Path
leader Abimael Guzma´n on 12 September 1992, and the subsequent arrest
of numerous Sendero cadres and fighters, facilitated anti-drug operations.
Now, the government wanted to reduce the drug revenues of the Shining Path,
although still mainly by attacking the higher echelons of the trade. Only in
the second half of the 1990s did coca eradication reach significant levels, with
tens of thousands of hectares eradicated.137 Operations against traffickers and
coca eradication made life more difficult for Colombian traffickers and may
well have convinced some of them of the need to reduce their dependency
on Peruvian coca. Violent confrontations between traffickers and the Shining
Path also contributed to reducing the presence of Colombians. This reduced
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presence, in turn, was a prerequisite for the verticalization of the Peruvian
drug industry, as it allowed more Peruvians to reach higher levels within the
industry. Moreover, Bolivians may have found it easier to procure coca and
coca paste from Peru and thus to increase cocaine production in, and drug
exports from, Bolivia.
Numerous other contingencies contributed to a restructuring of the South
American drug industry. In Peru, a relative improvement of the economy in
the mid-1990s made other products such as coffee more attractive to farm-
ers and thus reduced migration to regions where coca grew.138 Moreover, a
brief border war between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 increased the military
presence in the border region and thus probably forced traffickers to choose
alternative trafficking routes.139 Last, natural phenomena such as El Nin˜o
rains, which made some clandestine airstrips inoperable, also influenced the
business strategies of traffickers.140
To sum up this section, the empirical picture is highly complex. The dis-
placement of the drug industry is influenced by various contingencies that are
difficult to integrate into theoretical frameworks, since they appear randomly
and interact with one another. Taking them into account implies abstaining
from oversimplified statements about displacement. Although the ABDP did
indeed influence traffickers’ strategies, other factors, some of which were only
indirectly related, or not related at all, to US foreign policy, played a role as
well. But the issue is even more complex, as the next section shows.
Empirical black boxes and alternative explanations for displacement
Understanding and explaining displacement is hampered by empirical black
boxes resulting from the clandestine nature of the drug industry. Black boxes
often lead to a proliferation of explanations for displacement, since a specific
explanation cannot be excluded or proven beyond any doubt. In the present
context, one of the main black boxes pertains to the most direct effect of
the ABDP: the number of flights shot down, forced to the ground, deterred
from flying, and/or seized. Already during a Congressional hearing in 1994,
in which the cited number of suspected trafficking planes shot down over
Peru ranged from 0 to 31, one participant complained that “it would be sort of
nice to have our three top experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably
elementary question.”141
Generally, confusion reigns over the number of planes prevented from
delivering drug loads and over the question whether planes were shot down,
forced to land, or deterred from flying. According to Menzel, the Peruvian
military claimed that between 1991 and mid-1993, it had intercepted or shot
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down 124 trafficking aircraft. Other sources provide much lower estimates.142
During the ABDP’s main phase, figures remained controversial. Whereas the
US military reported in January 1996 that 27 smuggling planes had been shot
down during Operation Green Clover, US Secretary of Defense William Perry
three months later reduced the number of planes interdicted or shot down to
only 12.143 Other sources again cite different figures.144It is likely that fewer
planes were intercepted in Peru every year in the second half of 1990s, with
interception rates close to zero at the end of the millennium.145 In Colombia,
interception rates probably increased, although there is controversy over the
numbers involved.146
Estimates of deterrence effects are similarly vague, since traffickers do
not document how they adapt to law enforcement. Statements that purport
to show exactly how interaction altered smuggling patterns are dubious. In
October 1997, for example, McCaffrey alleged that Operation Green Clover
had reduced the number of drug flights by 47 percent.147 But how could
he know, given that the total number of trafficking flights was unknown?
Obviously, the lack of certainty regarding interception rates and deterrence
effects poses problems for assessing the contribution of the ABDP to the
restructuring of the Andean drug industry.
Another analytical challenge pertains to coca cultivation and cocaine pro-
duction. The US government figures stated above, which show a rise in Colom-
bian cultivation and a concomitant decline in Peruvian cultivation, are mere
estimates. Exact figures are not available because farmers hide illicit crops
among licit ones and because clouds often cover cultivation zones, just to
mention two reasons. It is not surprising, therefore, that some researchers,
for example Ricardo Vargas, provide higher cultivation estimates than those
presented by the US government and illustrated in the chart and table in the
annex.148 Moreover, hectare figures do not tell the whole story, because the
yields of coca fields can vary considerably. Traffickers often try to increase
the productivity of illicit crops. Indeed, particularly between 1998 and 2001,
better production methods helped to increase the productivity of fields.149
Further difficulties arise from the lack of sufficient knowledge about traf-
fickers. The discussion above admittedly oversimplified matters for the sake
of analytical parsimony. In reality, the situation was more complex. Traffick-
ers operating in Peru, for example, came not only from Colombia, but also
from Mexico. They may have entered the Peruvian drug market in 1993. Their
presence, which led to instances of conflict and cooperation with Colombian
traffickers, was still felt in the second half of the 1990s.150 Moreover, some
Peruvians, the best known of whom was Demetrio Limoniel Cha´vez, nick-
named El Vaticano, exported significant amounts of drugs to the US.151 Such
examples can be cited for the case of Bolivia as well.152 Hence, the South
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American cocaine industry was quite fuzzy, which makes it difficult to assess
the impact of the ABDP on the industry. If it is unclear which actors were
involved in the business, it is even more challenging to show why new actors
came to the fore.
In addition, the factors determining the fluctuation of coca prices are ob-
scure. In mid-2003, US embassy officials in Peru and Bolivia said that they
did not know the underlying mechanisms of fluctuating coca prices in these
two countries at that time.153 James Painter writes that it is “almost impossible
to ascertain the exact balance of factors in determining coca prices: whether
the buyers do operate a cartel (given their numbers), whether they can main-
tain low prices, and what is the relationship between Colombian and Bolivian
buyers.”154 Yet explaining changes in coca prices is crucial for assessing the
impact of US foreign policy on the drug industry, as high prices can lead
to more coca cultivation and low prices to the abandonment of fields. Price
changes are thus linked to displacement, and a fine-grained explanation of
displacement requires examining the reasons behind coca price changes.
To make matters more complicated, it is unclear whether air interdiction
reduced the amount of cocaine paste available in Colombia in the mid-1990s,
with the DEA saying that there was no shortage of cocaine paste and Colom-
bian specialist Ricardo Vargas reporting a steep rise in cocaine paste prices.155
A last black box deserves mentioning.156 In the early phase of the ABDP,
the demand for cocaine was rising particularly in Western Europe and else-
where. Cocaine prices in these expanding markets were higher than in the
US, leading traffickers to divert some supply routes and also bringing new
traffickers and trafficker alliances to the fore. Local Brazilian traffickers, for
example, appear to have struck alliances with Bolivian and Colombian coca
producers and cocaine traffickers, which accelerated the verticalization trend
particularly of the Bolivian cocaine industry. However, the causal impact of
this demand-induced process on the Andean drug industry is not clear. The
mutual constitution of demand and supply is a market force that is difficult to
observe or quantify.
Given these empirical black boxes, it is not surprising that assessments of
the ABDP’s impact vary. Authors working for the US Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA), for example, write in the first chapter of a report issued in
2000 that Colombian traffickers increased coca cultivation in Colombia in
1994. This “may have been” due to higher costs resulting from higher fees for
pilots flying from Peru to Colombia during interdiction operations Support
Justice IV in 1992/1993, or to the anticipation of traffickers that interdiction
would make the air bridge increasingly vulnerable.157 In the third chapter, the
authors write that it is “very likely” that Colombian traffickers invested in new
Colombian coca cultivation because they saw air smuggling as increasingly
64 CORNELIUS FRIESENDORF
risky.158 Similarly, in his 1996 book on drug policies in Peru and Bolivia,
Sewall Menzel argues that the ABDP “caused” a steep decrease in the prices
of coca leaves and cocaine paste. In his book on Colombia published one year
later, he adds the arrest of leading Cali traffickers as a further cause of the
drop in prices.159
Empirical black boxes can lead to a proliferation of explanations of dis-
placement. One could argue, for example, that the increase in Colombian coca
cultivation and the concomitant decline in Peru, as well as the dispersion of
trafficking routes, would have occurred even in the absence of the ABDP
due to the stronger role of Colombian non-state armed forces and smaller
trafficking groups, more poverty in Colombia and less poverty in Peru, the
dismantling of the Shining Path, and the spread of the fungus in Peru.
However, this alternative explanation of displacement is less convincing
than an explanation that stresses the role of the ABDP as one of the reasons
of displacement. After all, and as indicated above, traffickers seem to have
taken the ABDP into account. Although air interdiction is a less-than-perfect
deterrence against aerial smuggling since traffickers can circumvent interdic-
tion or wait until surveillance equipment is withdrawn,160 smugglers had to
find new ways of staying in business as interdiction was stepped up. Already
in the late 1980s, the drug ring of Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha may have grown
coca in Colombia to be prepared for cuts in Peruvian and Bolivian supply.161
In late November 1995, after a period during which the Peruvian air force
had applied a lethal shoot-down policy, lethal interdiction was suspended for
over a month. During that time, smuggling flights are reported to have risen
sharply.162 The impact of the ABDP on smugglers’ risk perceptions is in-
dicated by pilot fees as well. Whereas in 1994, pilots had asked for around
$30,000 to fly one drug load across the border of Peru and Colombia, in 1997
the price was around $180,000.163 The IDA report mentioned above confirms
the responsiveness of smugglers to air interdiction:
Between 1989 and 1995, three only moderately successful operations had
seldom interdicted more than 2.5 percent of the known trafficker flights.
[. . .] [From 1995], the Peruvians achieved a remarkable degree of success.
From March through November, air interdiction rates averaging 13 percent
deterred another 64 percent of trafficker flights. [. . .] From a pilot’s per-
spective, an interdiction rate of 12 percent backed by lethal force would
be daunting. If a pilot expects to smuggle six times in his career – the
average number for inmates in federal prisons – surviving six flights with
an 88 percent chance of success on each yields only a 46 percent chance
of surviving all six attempts. Less than 50:50 chances of survival cannot
be very attractive to pilots.164
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It is important to note the limits of this statement. First, IDA reports on drug
interdiction have received devastating reviews from scholars who reproached
IDA authors for starting with a conclusion instead of with empirical data.165
Moreover, the report cited above is based on the dubious assumption that
clandestine activities can be precisely quantified. Nevertheless, the report
supports the argument that the ABDP provided some form of deterrent, or at
the very least that traffickers had to take it into account and therefore diversified
their trafficking routes and methods. Hence, although some displacement may
have taken place even without the ABDP, displacement would probably have
occurred slower and less intensively. After all, the air bridge was a fairly
convenient way for traffickers to do business.
The ABDP also contributed to the verticalization of the Peruvian and Bo-
livian drug industries, albeit in an indirect way, by reducing the number of
Colombians buying coca and cocaine paste in Peru and Bolivia (although
law enforcement in Colombia played a role as well). It is possible that the
Colombians would have come under pressure from security forces and com-
petitors anyway, but they were fairly well entrenched and would not have
given up their business shares easily if it had not been for US-sponsored air
interdiction.
Moreover, alternative development, the spread of the fungus, the exhaus-
tion of coca fields, or coca eradication cannot satisfactorily explain the drop in
Peruvian coca prices in the mid-1990s. Since these factors limited the supply
of coca leaves, they should have driven up prices. The ABDP is thus a more
convincing explanation for the decrease in Peruvian cultivation than these
other factors166 (although the arrests of leading traffickers from Cali played a
role as well), since it reduced the demand for Peruvian coca. More generally,
and to sum up this section, in the absence of the ABDP, displacement would
probably not have occurred in the way it actually did.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to understand and explain the restructuring
of the South American coca/cocaine industry in the 1990s, or more precisely,
to examine the link between the displacement of the drug industry and the
Air Bridge Denial Program, a US-sponsored attempt to interdict the aerial
smuggling of cocaine paste from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia. The first part
provided an overview of achievements and shortcomings of the drug policy
literature. It argued that scholars have paid too little attention to the causation
of foreign policy side effects. This part also developed a causal mechanism
for understanding and explaining displacement.
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In the second part, it was shown that US-sponsored air interdiction coin-
cided with the displacement of coca cultivation from Peru to Colombia, the
verticalization of the Peruvian and Bolivian drug industries, and the diversi-
fication of drug trafficking routes. This restructuring process was particularly
visible during the main phase of the ABDP lasting from 1995 to 2001. When
the ABDP was suspended, the South American drug industry was much more
complex than in the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e., at the time when the US began
to implement the ABDP.
The third part of the article examined the different elements constituting the
initial causal mechanism in order to better understand and explain displace-
ment. First, it was shown that a selective application of US foreign policy
pressure contributed to displacement. US agencies often did not properly co-
ordinate their activities, pressure was applied only locally, and the emphasis
was put on coercive measures with short-term effects. However, it must be
noted that the displacement of coca cultivation to Colombia occurred despite
large-scale US-sponsored aerial eradication.
Second, the analysis showed that traffickers proved to be highly flexible
in their attempts to evade air interdiction. They used sophisticated technology
that was often superior to that used by security forces, but also employed
simple, effective means. Moreover, in the face of concerted interdiction, traf-
fickers increased smuggling on roads, rivers, and the ocean. Furthermore,
traffickers did not fail to see the advantages of increasing the cocaine output
in Bolivia and Peru. Meanwhile in Colombia, traffickers, either to improve
efficiency or out of necessity, induced peasants to plant coca.
As a third element for explaining displacement, the causal mechanism
posited weak law enforcement capacities on the part of drug producing and
transit states. Lack of territorial control and corruption were particularly con-
ducive to the spread of coca cultivation to Colombia and the diversification
of trafficking routes. While the partial destruction of the Shining Path in Peru
helped to reduce the presence of Colombian traffickers in Peru, the drug in-
dustry in Colombia thrived under an explosive mix of idiosyncrasies.
This leads to the fourth, and last, element of the initial causal mechanism:
contingent conditions. The displacement of the drug industry was enabled
by numerous military, political, economic, and social conditions, many of
which were unrelated to US foreign policy. In Peru, the spread of a mysteri-
ous fungus, pressure on the Shining Path, and a relative improvement of the
economy contributed to a steep decrease in the size of land used for illicit
cultivation and the spread of coca to Colombia. In Colombia, the intensity of
aerial smuggling fluctuated depending on the structure of the country’s traf-
ficking industry. Flights to Peru decreased, and indigenous coca cultivation
increased, with the decline of the Medellı´n and Cali groups, the proliferation
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of smaller groups, and the strengthening of rebels and paramilitaries. These
developments were both a cause and consequence of the weakness of the
Colombian state and society. These and other contingent conditions under-
line that the popular metaphor of displacement as a balloon effect is mis-
leading, since this metaphor is based on a mono-causal understanding of
displacement.
In addition to these contingent conditions, an assessment of the reasons
behind displacement is complicated by empirical black boxes. Not least due
to these black boxes, one could argue that the ABDP did not have any impact
on displacement. However, this statement is as exaggerated as the contrary
view held by many US policymakers that the ABDP was successful since it
caused a reduction of Peruvian coca cultivation. This article has cited sub-
stantial evidence showing that a host of factors led to displacement, but that
US-sponsored air interdiction was one of these. In the absence of the ABDP,
a restructuring of the South American drug industry may have occurred as
well, but probably along different spatial and temporal lines. The ABDP was
thus a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the kind of displace-
ment described in this article.167 US foreign drug policies have once more
contributed to reshaping South American history.
It is important to note that this article presented a plausibility argument;
it did not systematically test the validity of the causal mechanism through
standard positivist methods such as controlled variation of explanatory factors,
because these methods would have been inappropriate at this early stage in the
theorizing of displacement. The need for a heuristic, interpretative approach
arose from the presence of various empirical black boxes, the presence of
complex, dynamic interaction effects, the fuzzy nature of corruption and other
phenomena contributing to displacement, and the difficulty of assigning causal
weight to explanatory factors and processes. Another caveat is that while
this article has focused on US-sponsored aerial drug interdiction, various
other law enforcement operations were undertaken by the US and Andean
governments simultaneously with air interdiction. Last, this article looked at
one case only, i.e. one anti-drug initiative (air interdiction) against one type
of drug (cocaine) in one region (South America) during a particular period
(the 1990s).
Given these empirical and methodological problems and research choices,
doubts remain about the causal impact of the ABDP and the validity of the
causal mechanism. It cannot be ruled out beyond doubt that unknown factors,
contingent conditions unrelated to US air interdiction, or other law enforce-
ment activities in South America had a greater impact on the region’s illicit
drug industry than the ABDP. To assess the validity of this article’s tenta-
tive findings, the causal mechanism must be applied to more cases to find
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out whether it operates independently of time, space, and type of drug, i.e.,
whether it constitutes a general mechanism.168 Moreover, more empirical in-
formation is needed to tell a more complete and more coherent story. These
shortcomings notwithstanding, the available evidence supports the argument
that the ABDP contributed to fundamental changes in the South American
drug industry. Air interdiction has made a difference.
The change, however, has not been for the better. This article, which aimed
at understanding and explaining displacement, has disregarded the conse-
quences of displacement and the impact of air interdiction on democracy and
human rights in Latin America. Yet it is important to note that the ABDP, by
contributing to an increase in Colombian coca cultivation and a proliferation
of trafficking routes, has made the Colombian conflict even more intractable
and has contributed to spreading drug-related problems such as violence and
corruption across South America. Moreover, air interdiction forged a close
relationship between the US and the Fujimori-Montesinos regime. Cynthia
McClintock and Fabia´n Vallas are right in pointing out that this relationship
has given rise to many questions about the overall anti-drug effort.169 Besides,
air interdiction has cost US taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, without
improving drug problems in the US. Planners of current and future aerial drug
interdiction programs (such as the air interdiction program restarted in Colom-
bia in August 2003, whose results, according to a September 2005 report of
the US Government Accountability Office, were mixed)170 should take into
account the ineffectiveness and ‘collateral damage’ of air interdiction from
the late 1980s until 2001.
The problem is, of course, that the US drug war continues despite the
lessons of history – for well-known reasons. These include the ability of
politicians to attract votes through promises to be tough on drugs; vested in-
terests of US federal agencies and business sectors such as the arms industry;
media corporations that prefer to show Special Forces rather than drug treat-
ment facilities; and the partially irrational, yet resilient support among many
policymakers and parts of the public for law enforcement and punishment.
Given these obstacles, Peter Reuter’s assessment that research has had little
influence on US drug policy is not surprising.171
Drug policy researchers largely agree on what needs to be done to make
US drug policies less ineffective (and maybe even more effective) and to
mitigate the negative side effects of policies implemented under the constraints
imposed by drug prohibition. Coercive international drug policies in source
or transit countries that are intended to raise drug prices in the US fail to take
into account industry characteristics such as the drug value-addition process.
Domestic law enforcement is arguably slightly more effective in raising prices,
reducing availability, and reducing purity than international coercive policies
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– but it also fails to reduce supply significantly, and it leads to costs such as
exploding prison populations.
Harm reduction on the drug production and consumption side is a viable
alternative to the law enforcement and punishment model that has dominated
US drug policies for so long.172 In South America and elsewhere, alternative
development can help reduce the dependency of farmers on illicit crops. Al-
though alternative development is no panacea to drug problems (it can actually
contribute to pushing illicit cultivation to new areas, as probably happened in
Thailand and Burma)173, it is better suited than coercion to achieve a sustain-
able reduction of drug supplies over a long term, which in turn could translate
into less drug consumption. With regard to domestic drug policies in the US,
drug treatment and prevention, as well as research into the causes and conse-
quences of drugs and drug policies, are simply the best options. To the extent
that these non-coercive domestic policies help reduce the demand for illicit
drugs, they would give additional impetus to supply reduction. Will the US
move toward harm reduction? The obstacles to drug policy reform mentioned
above warrant skepticism.
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